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Abstract – This paper is the first to investigate the corporate governance role of shareholder-
initiated proxy proposals in European firms. While proposals in the US are nonbinding even if 
they pass the shareholder vote, they are legally binding in the UK and most of Continental 
Europe. Nonetheless, submissions remain relatively infrequent in Continental Europe in 
particular, with major variations across countries in ownership structures, monitoring 
incentives, and the laws and regulations governing shareholder access to the proxy. We use 
sample selection models to analyze target selection and proposal success in terms of the 
voting outcomes and the stock price effects, and make several contributions to the literature. 
First, proposal submissions remain infrequent compared to the US in Continental Europe in 
particular. In the UK proposals typically relate to a proxy contest seeking board changes, 
while in Continental Europe they are more focused on specific governance issues. Second, 
there is some evidence that the proposal sponsors are valuable monitors, because the target 
firms tend to underperform and have low leverage. The sponsors also observe the identity of 
the voting shareholders, because proposal probability increases in the target’s ownership 
concentration and the equity stake of institutional investors. Third, while proposals enjoy 
limited voting success across Europe, they are relatively more successful in the UK. The 
outcomes are strongest for proposals targeting the board but are also affected by the target 
characteristics including the CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity. Finally, proposals are met 
with strong negative stock price effects when they are voted upon at general meetings. This 
suggests that rather than attribute them control benefits, the market often interprets proposals 
and their failure to pass the vote as a negative signal of governance concerns. Indeed, the 
market responds better to proposals submitted against large firms with low leverage, which is 
consistent with agency considerations. However, the stock price effects are most negative for 
poorly performing firms with low market-to-book ratios, which implies that the proposal 
outcomes only intensify the market’s concerns over firms that have previously 
underperformed. 
Keywords: Shareholder activism, shareholder proposals, corporate governance, sample 
selection. 
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1. Introduction 
Shareholder activism through the proxy process has been subject to intense debate in 
the US academic literature. Some studies regard shareholder-initiated proxy proposals as a 
useful tool of corporate governance and the proposal sponsors as valuable monitoring agents 
(Bebchuk (2005); Harris and Raviv (2008); Renneboog and Szilagyi (2009)). Others argue 
that the same proposals have no real control benefits due to their nonbinding nature (Gillan 
and Starks (2000); Prevost and Rao (2000)), and that the proponents either disrupt the board’s 
authority unnecessarily or outright pursue their own self-serving agendas (Anabtawi (2006); 
Bainbridge (2006)). 
While shareholder proposals are rarely mentioned in the European context, the 
business press regularly cites prominent cases of dissenting shareholders targeting European 
firms. Activists ousted the chairman of African Platinum as the firm underperformed its 
industry peers (Bream (2006)), and pushed Dutch banking giant ABN Amro into selling itself 
(Larsen (2007)). In another well-known example, Acquisitor Holdings targeted the UK 
dotcom firm Baltimore Technologies. In March 2004, Acquisitor Holdings requisitioned an 
extraordinary general meeting to replace Baltimore’s board of directors. Baltimore claimed 
that Acquisitor, which then owned 10% of its equity, was opportunistically trying to drive 
down its share price in a bid to increase its ownership stake (Stewart (2004)). However, 
Acquisitor pointed out that Baltimore had accumulated trading losses of over GBP1 billion 
through its poor acquisition strategy, and even launched a website criticizing the CEO (Shah 
(2004)). Leading up to the meeting on May 6, the battle continued in the press. Baltimore 
revealed plans to transform into a green energy firm and labeled Acquisitor a vulture fund but 
subsequently apologized (Harrison (2004)). In response, Acquisitor called the green energy 
concept “outrageous” and increased its stake to over 16% (Boxell (2004a)). At the meeting, 
Baltimore directors survived a knife-edge vote as shareholders, many of whom had lost 
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personal fortunes, were unhappy with the plans of both Baltimore and Acquisitor (Boxell 
(2004b)). In his statement to the press, Baltimore’s chairman struck a cordial tone when he 
called for co-operation with Acquisitor and invited negotiations to be conducted privately 
(Smyth (2004)). As the firm’s annual general meeting in July approached, management 
abandoned the clean energy plan, placing the blame on Acquisitor for a failed takeover 
(Wendlandt (2004)), and proposed to pay its shareholders a special dividend (Klinger (2004)). 
Acquisitor, which by then had increased its ownership stake to over 25%, successfully 
blocked the dividend payout (Shah (2004b)). The power struggle ended at the meeting where 
Acquisitor replaced management with its own nominees (Nuttall (2004)). 
These and other notable cases of shareholder proposals show that European 
shareholders view the proxy process as a viable tool of expressing dissent and disciplining 
management. However, it is clear that US lessons on the corporate governance role of 
shareholder proposals may not be readily applicable in the European context. First, proposals 
in the US are non-binding even if they pass the shareholder vote, whereas they are legally 
binding in the UK and in most of Continental Europe. Second, the laws and regulations 
governing shareholder access to the proxy vary considerably across countries, thereby 
affecting the incentives of and costs borne by the proponent shareholders. And third, the 
market-oriented Anglo-American model of corporate governance is very different from the 
stakeholder-oriented regimes of Continental Europe. La Porta et al. (1998) show, and 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) confirm, that minority shareholders enjoy much better 
protection under US and UK common law, with Continental European firms often violating 
the one share-one vote rule by issuing multiple classes of stock, setting up pyramids, or 
engaging in cross-shareholdings. In Continental Europe, corporate ownership is also more 
concentrated (Barca and Becht (2001); Faccio and Lang (2002)), and while banks are 
predominantly passive investors in the US, they actively engage in proxy voting in countries 
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such as Germany (Franks and Mayer (2001)). Finally, major creditors and employees are 
often given board representation in Continental Europe, which implies conflicts of interest 
between the board and outside shareholders (Roe (2004)). 
This paper is the first to investigate the corporate governance role of shareholder 
proposals across Europe, using a sample of 290 proposals submitted in eight countries 
between 1998 and 2008. While Buchanan and Yang (2008) provide an elaborate comparison 
of proposal submissions in the US versus the UK, our analysis also includes Continental 
Europe, which is both very different from a corporate governance perspective and quite 
diverse in itself. 
We simultaneously investigate the selection of target firms and proposal success in 
terms of the voting outcomes and the stock price effects, and make several contributions to 
the literature. First, compared to the US, proposal submissions remain relatively infrequent in 
Continental Europe in particular. In the UK, proposals typically relate to a proxy contest 
seeking personal changes on the board to force a change in corporate strategy. In Continental 
Europe, the proposal objectives are more focused on specific governance issues, 
corresponding to the conventional use of shareholder proposals in the US. 
Second, we show that the target firms tend to underperform as well as have low 
leverage, which Jensen (1986) regards as remedy to free cash flow problems. This coincides 
with the results of Renneboog and Szilagyi (2009) for the US, and provides some indication 
that the activists sponsoring proposal submissions are valuable monitors. There is also 
evidence that the proposal sponsors observe the identity of the voting shareholders, to the 
extent that proposal probability increases in the target firm’s ownership concentration as well 
as the equity stake of institutional investors. 
Third, we find that shareholder proposals enjoy relatively modest voting success in 
both the UK and Continental Europe. The voting outcomes are most fundamentally driven by 
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the issue addressed, and are strongest for proposals that seek personal changes on the board 
and therefore indicate major governance concerns. However, they are also affected by the 
characteristics of the target firm, most notably the extent to which the CEO is incentivized 
through stock-based pay to protect shareholder interests. 
Finally, we find that irrespective of the proposal objectives, the shareholder vote on 
proposal submissions induces significantly negative stock price effects. This suggests that 
rather than attribute them control benefits, the market interprets proposals and their failure to 
pass the shareholder vote as a negative signal of governance concerns. Indeed, consistent with 
agency considerations the market responds better to proposals submitted against large firms 
with low leverage. However, the stock price effects are more negative for poorly performing 
firms with low market-to-book ratios and ill-incentivized CEOs, which indicates that 
unsuccessful shareholder attempts to exert discipline only exacerbate governance concerns. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on shareholder activism through the proxy 
process. Section 3 discusses the corporate governance structures of the US, the UK, and 
Continental Europe, and describes the country-specific laws and regulations governing 
shareholder-initiated proxy proposals. Section 4 provides a description of our sample and 
investigates proposal success in terms of the voting outcomes and stock price effects. In 
Section 5 we use sample selection models to perform a multivariate analysis of both target 
selection and proposal success. Finally, Section 6 allows for some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The literature on shareholder activism through the proxy process 
2.1. The role of shareholder proposals in the US 
Gillan and Starks (2007) place shareholder activism on a continuum of responses that 
dissatisfied investors can give to corporate governance concerns. At one extreme of the 
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continuum, shareholders can simply vote with their feet by selling their shares (Parrino, Sias, 
and Starks, 2003). At the other extreme is the market for corporate control, where investors 
initiate takeovers and buyouts to bring about fundamental changes (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983). The role of shareholder activism arises when shareholders continue to hold their shares 
and seek changes within the firm without a change in control. These investors may then press 
for corporate reforms by negotiating with management behind the scenes, or – especially 
when management is unresponsive – by submitting proposals for shareholder vote. Armour 
(2008) views this process as a private and informal enforcement mechanism, with private and 
formal mechanisms comprising lawsuits and litigation, and public mechanisms initiated by 
public bodies. 
While shareholder-initiated proxy proposals are generally considered to be a relatively 
weak disciplinary tool, the academic debate in the US has recently heated up on whether they 
have any control benefits at all. Bebchuk (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2008) advocate 
shareholder participation in corporate governance, and argue that proxy proposals are a useful 
and relevant means of mitigating managerial agency problems. However, Prevost and Rao 
(2000) point out that even if they pass the shareholder vote, proxy proposals are likely to be 
ineffective in disciplining management because they are nonbinding under the SEC’s Rule 
14a-8. The authors add that proposal submissions often convey a negative signal of failed 
negotiations with management, because institutional activists often try to negotiate behind the 
scenes and only sponsor proposals as a last resort. The main argument offered against 
shareholder proposals is that the sponsoring shareholders are likely to pursue their own self-
serving agendas (Woidtke (2002), Anabtawi (2006), Prevost, Rao, and Williams (2009)) or be 
simply too uninformed to make effective governance decisions (Lipton (2002), Stout (2007)).  
Bainbridge (2006) goes as far as claiming that proposal submissions should be restricted by 
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the SEC, because they do more damage than good by disrupting the decision-making 
authority of the board of directors. 
Despite these arguments, the empirical US literature finds considerable evidence that 
shareholder proposals should be regarded as a useful governance tool and the proposal 
sponsors as valuable monitoring agents. Recent studies confirm that proposal submissions 
exert pressure on the target firms despite their nonbinding nature, because as much as 40% of 
the proposals that win a majority vote end up being implemented (Bizjak and Marquette, 
1998; Martin and Thomas, 1999; Thomas and Cotter, 2007; Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben, 
2008). Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben (2008) show that targets ignoring passed proposals are 
penalized by drawing negative press and downgrades by governance rating firms, and their 
their directors are less likely to be reelected and more likely to lose other directorships1. 
Other studies find that the proposal sponsors tend to have the “correct” objective of 
disciplining management, and as such claims of their agenda-seeking are exaggerated. Early 
studies report that proposal submissions tend to be directed at large, poorly performing firms 
(Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Martin and Thomas (1999)). Renneboog and 
Szilagyi (2009) add that the targets tend to be underlevered as well as have generally poor 
governance structures including (i) managers entrenched by antitakeover devices, (ii) 
ineffective boards, and (iii) ill-incentivized CEOs. Smith (1996) shows that the proposal 
sponsors also consider the voting shareholders before deciding whether or not to submit proxy 
proposals, because the targets tend to have high institutional and low insider ownership. 
The literature confirms that the target firm’s governance quality is also observed by 
the voting shareholders. Gillan and Starks (2007) find that the voting results are mostly driven 
by the proposal objectives and the sponsoring shareholders. However, Ertimur, Ferri, and 
                                                 
1 Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) find that dissatisfied activists often target director elections with “just 
vote no” campaigns. 
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Stubben (2008) and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2009) shows that irrespective of the issue 
addressed, proposals draw more voting support if the target has heavily entrenched managers 
and ineffective boards. Cremers and Romano (2007) report that the identity of the voting 
shareholders is also relevant. On one hand, voting support increases in institutional and 
decreases in insider ownership. On the other, insurance firms and banks’ trust departments are 
less likely to vote in favor of shareholder proposals than are other institutional investors. 
Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) and Pound (1988) regard these investors as being pressure-
sensitive due to their existing or potential business relationships with the firms they invest in, 
which increases the risk of conflicted voting. 
The US literature examines the stock price effects of shareholder proposals around the 
dates the proxy statements are mailed (Bhagat, 1983; Bhagat and Brickley, 1984). Early event 
studies find no evidence that the market recognizes shareholder proposals as a relevant 
control mechanism (Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996); Bizjak and Marquette (1998); 
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999); Prevost and Rao (2000); Thomas and Cotter (2007). 
However, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2009) find that proposal announcements are actually met 
with significantly positive stock price reactions, which are sensitive to the proposal objectives 
but are most fundamentally driven by the target firm’s past performance and quality of 
governance structures. 
 
2.2. The role of shareholder proposals in Europe 
Shareholder activism through the proxy process is seldom discussed in the European 
corporate governance literature. Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi (forthcoming) examine the 
activist strategies of a single institutional investor, the Hermes UK Focus Fund. The study 
shows that similar to US funds, Hermes rarely submits proxy proposals for shareholder vote, 
instead negotiating successfully with management behind the scenes. The authors attribute 
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this to management concerns of the fund requisitioning an extraordinary general meeting, 
with the looming prospect of a proxy fight. While Klein and Zur (2009) make a similar point 
for the US, this threat is even larger in the UK where passed proposals are legally binding, 
and shareholders can remove directors by an ordinary resolution.  
Results of a recent survey by McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009) show that the 
types of corrective actions considered by most U.S. and Dutch institutional investors are 
selling shares (80%), voting against the company at the annual meeting (66%) and initiating a 
discussion with the executive board (55%). Their findings, similarly to Becht et al. 
(forthcoming) suggest that institutions use a wide range of measures to impact the firm’s 
decisions, some of which take place behind the scenes, unnoticed by the market. 
Buchanan and Yang (2008) are the first to perform a comparison of US and UK 
proposal submissions. The authors find that the target firms tend to be poorly performing in 
both countries, but report systematic differences in the proposal objectives, the sponsor 
identities, as well as the voting outcomes. An important insight of the paper is that UK 
proposals draw more voting support, especially when they target personal changes on the 
board, and that they are often implemented even if they are later withdrawn. However, 
subsequent performance improvements are only detected in US firms, as measured by 
profitability, dividend payout, leverage, and stock price effects. 
Girard (2009) is the only study to discuss the governance role of shareholder proposals 
in Continental Europe, by investigating activist strategies in France. The author examines the 
success rate of behind-the-scenes negotiations, targeting firms through the media, proposal 
submissions, and civil law suits. The results show that launching lawsuits is the preferred 
method of activists engaging firms over governance concerns, and that this particularly 
aggressive strategy is also more likely to succeed than other forms of activism including the 
submission of proxy proposals. 
 10 
Previous studies report no evidence at all on the corporate governance role of 
shareholder proposals in Continental Europe. An interesting study by De Jong, Mertens and 
Rosenboom (2006) examines the proposals presented to shareholders at the general meetings 
of Dutch firms. The authors find that during their sample period, all proposals put to 
shareholder vote were in fact sponsored by the board of directors. Furthermore, the number of 
votes cast against these submissions was negligible, with only nine out of 1,583 proposals 
either rejected or withdrawn. 
Overall, the literature is clearly incomplete on the extent to which the proxy process is 
accessible to European shareholders as a disciplinary device, and if so, whether proposal 
submissions are useful and effective in mitigating corporate governance concerns. The 
available evidence implies considerable variation across Europe in this regard, as is discussed 
in the following sections of this paper. 
 
3. The regulatory environment in European countries 
The corporate governance role of shareholder proposals should heavily depend (i) on 
the extent to which laws and regulations support shareholder access to the proxy process, and 
(ii) the rules and practicalities of proxy solicitation. We now assess the differences in this 
regard across European countries. 
 
3.1 Shareholder access to the proxy process 
A key difference in the legal treatment of shareholder proposals between the US and 
Europe is that while passed proposals are only advisory in nature in the US, they are legally 
binding in the UK and most of Continental Europe except the Netherlands. The corporate 
governance laws and best practices of European countries generally recognize that in order to 
protect their interests, minority shareholders must be provided with access to general 
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meetings as well as the right to submit proxy proposals for shareholder vote. Nonetheless, the 
provisions governing shareholder access to the proxy typically remain stringent compared to 
the US. US shareholders are not allowed to call extraordinary meetings unless the corporate 
charter or bylaws allow otherwise. However, shareholders owing 1% of the voting shares or 
USD 1,000 in market value may submit proxy proposals for shareholder vote. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the legal requirements for submitting proxy proposals 
and convening extraordinary meetings in eight European countries. The table shows that the 
required voting capital varies considerably across countries. In the UK, shareholders owning 
no less than 5% of the firm’s issued share capital may submit proposals to be voted upon at a 
general meeting. Alternatively, a group of at least 100 shareholders, each with no less than 
GBP100 invested, may also put forward a proposal. To call an extraordinary meeting, the 
support of at least 10% of the voting capital is required. 
− Insert Table 1 about here − 
France is somewhat more lenient than the UK in that shareholders owning 5% of the 
voting capital may both submit proposals and call extraordinary meetings. This ownership 
requirement is gradually reduced with the increase of capital, to 4% between EUR 750,000-
4.5 million, 3% between EUR 4.5 million-7.5 million, 2% between EUR 7.5 million-15 
million, and 1% over EUR 15 million. A noteworthy provision of the French Commercial 
Code is that even though a meeting can only deliberate on items on its agenda, “it may 
nevertheless remove one or more directors or supervisory board members from office and 
replace them, in any circumstances”2. Shareholders entitled to change the agenda of a 
meeting may also demand that a representative appointed by the court convene the meeting3. 
                                                 
2 Commercial Code/Book II title II chapter V section III Article L225-105 and L225-120. 
3 Commercial Code/Book II title II chapter V section III Article L225-103; 2001 May. 
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The German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) provides that new agenda items 
and extraordinary meetings can be set by shareholders owning a minimum 5% of the voting 
capital. However, any shareholder may add a proposal to the existing items of a meeting’s 
agenda, thus the proposal sponsors often include even university professors4. The similar 
Austrian Aktiengesetz also provides that general meetings can be called by shareholders 
owning at least 5% of the voting capital, but proposals can be submitted by those owning 1% 
or EUR 70,000 of capital5.  
The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance requires firms to inform 
all shareholders in the notice of the general meeting about their right “to propose resolutions 
in respect of matters to be dealt with by the general meeting”. Shareholders owning at least 
5% of the issued share capital have the right to convene an extraordinary meeting.  
In the Netherlands, 10% or more of the voting capital is needed to requisition an 
extraordinary meeting. Proposals may be submitted by shareholders with a stake of at least 
1% or EUR 50 million of the firm’s shares and certificates6. However, only management or 
the supervisory board may propose resolutions on certain topics including amendments to the 
articles of association, share issues and subscription rights, asset sales, and the dissolution of 
the firm itself. Furthermore, provisions of the articles of association that limit the general 
                                                 
4 Ekkehard Wenger and Leonhard Knoll, both from the Julius-Maximilians Universität Würzburg. Knoll 
sponsored 54 of the sample proposals, either alone or jointly with Wenger. 
5 The Austrian Aktiengesetz also provides that when a meeting is convened by a shareholder, whether the costs 
are to be borne by the firm or the shareholder will be decided at the meeting. 
6 Dutch certificates are tradable depository receipts, issued at the initiative of the supervisory board, that carry 
cash flow rights but no voting rights. They are designed to replace ordinary shares, which are then deposited 
with the issuer, the administration office. The administration office takes over all voting rights on the retired 
shares, thus typically taking a voting majority in the firm. It is always friendly to the management board, and is 
run by members of the supervisory and/or management boards as well as outside individuals. 
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meeting’s power to amend the articles may only be altered by a unanimous decision of a 
general meeting where 100% of the share capital is represented.  
In Switzerland, shareholders must own CHF 1 million of the issued share capital to 
place a resolution on the meeting agenda, unless the articles of association specify otherwise. 
In line with the recommendations of the Swiss Corporate Governance Code, large firms such 
as UBS and Novartis have lowered this threshold, with the minimum ownership requirement 
often less than 0.1%. To convene an extraordinary meeting, a petition submitted by 
shareholders owning no less than 10% of the share capital is required. 
Finally, while governance standards in Russia are gradually improving, the resolution 
of disputes between management and minority shareholders is complicated by institutional 
loopholes and weaknesses in the protection of shareholder rights. Nonetheless, shareholders 
with 2% or more of the voting stock can propose items for the agenda of a general meeting, 
while 10% of the voting stock is required to convene an extraordinary meeting. 
 
3.2. Proxy solicitation and corporate ownership 
An important consideration likely to affect proposal submissions is that the sponsoring 
activist must seek the support of other shareholders. The European Commission (2006) points 
out that the rules and formalities for proxy solicitation vary considerably within Europe. In 
the UK, the solicitation request would be included in the proxy documents and distributed to 
all shareholders at no major cost to the activist. In other countries, the solicitation of proxies 
at the firm’s expense is prohibited, so the production and distribution costs of the solicitation 
request are borne by the activist (European Commission (2006)). 
Manifest (2008) find that for large firms, shareholder participation at annual meetings 
is fairly consistent across European countries, at 55.5% of the voting capital in France, 54.8% 
in Germany, and 61.8% in the UK. However, the European Commission (2006) adds that the 
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attendance rate of the free float tends to be low in Continental Europe, at 10.1% in Germany 
and 17.5% in France compared with 53.2% in the UK. There are many reasons why 
shareholders would be prevented or discouraged from voting in Continental Europe in 
particular. First, meeting attendance is often hindered by the late availability or 
incompleteness of meeting-related information, resolutions in summary form, and overly 
short notice periods. Second, national regulations in some countries make proxy voting 
unduly cumbersome and prohibitively costly, with stringent restrictions on who and how may 
be appointed as a proxy. And third, many jurisdictions maintain the practice of share 
blocking, whereby shareholders must deposit their shares for a few days before general 
meetings to be able to vote. Share blocking exists to ensure that those who show up to vote 
are actually shareholders on the day of the vote. However, it is very costly for shareholders, as 
it prevents them from negotiating shares up to weeks in advance of general meetings7. 
In terms of proxy solicitation, it is an important fact that while large US firms tend to 
have widely dispersed ownership structures, ownership in the UK and Continental Europe is 
more concentrated. Goergen and Renneboog (2001) find that in the average UK firm, eight or 
more shareholders must join forces to attain a majority vote, which renders it fairly difficult to 
forge voting coalitions. Nonetheless, Becht and Mayer (2001) find that at 10%, the typical 
voting block in the UK is twice the size of that in the US. 
The largest voting blocks in Continental Europe tend to be even larger, ranging from 
20% on average in France to 44% in the Netherlands and 57% in Germany.8 These are often 
accumulated through pyramidal ownership structures, with approximately 40% of the largest 
firms held through pyramids in Austria, France, and Germany. Continental European firms 
                                                 
7 See European Commission (2006), DSW (2008), and Manifest (2008) for detailed discussions. 
8 The average market capitalization of the top ten nonfinancial firms is considerably lower in Europe compared 
to the US. Within Europe, the top firms are twice as large in UK than in Continental Europe (La Porta et al. 
(1998)). 
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also often deviate from the one share-one vote rule by issuing multiple classes of stock, 
granting multiple voting rights, and introducing voting right ceilings. In France, for example, 
it is possible to establish a double voting right for registered shares that have been held for 
two years. DSW (2008) finds that such structures are allowed across Continental Europe 
except a few countries such as Austria, Germany and Norway, while they are virtually absent 
in the US and the UK. 
Becht (2001) finds that the blockholders of US firms tend to be managers or directors, 
followed by institutional investors. Institutional investors are likely to support shareholder-
initiated proposal submissions, although they are often passive or simply tend to vote with 
their feet. Insider blockholdings should clearly reduce the probability that a proposal is 
submitted or later passes the shareholder vote. On one hand, managers and directors are 
unlikely to cast their votes in favor of a shareholder proposal. On the other, insider ownership 
should help realign insider and shareholder interests, thereby mitigating the expropriation 
concerns of minority shareholders.  
In the UK, institutional investors are the most important corporate owners, and they 
tend to be as passive as their US counterparts. Goergen and Renneboog (2001) point out that 
this often lends considerable power to the board of directors. On one hand, the proxy votes 
not exercised by shareholders are controlled by the board. On the other, directors themselves 
are the second largest blockholders in UK firms. 
Faccio and Lang (2002) find that while 63% of UK firms can be regarded as being 
widely held, 50-60% of Continental European firms are effectively owned by families. In 
addition, many large firms are controlled by banks and holding companies. While banks tend 
not to hold significant equity in US and UK firms, they control 15% of the largest firms in 
Germany and Portugal, and 5% in France and Switzerland (La Porta et al. (1999)). Goergen 
and Renneboog (2001) point out that in Germany, the effective voting power of banks extends 
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well beyond their ownership stakes, because they tend to engage in proxy voting such that 
they exercise the voting rights on the shares deposited with them. Nibler (1998) reports that in 
German listed firms, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank have an overall 
equity stake of 6.8% on average, but control another 14.4% of the votes through proxies. 
 
4.  Sample description and univariate analysis of proposal objectives, voting outcomes, 
and stock price effects 
We investigate the corporate governance role of shareholder proposals in Europe using 
submissions reported by the Manifest database. The database contains a total of 720 
proposals. However, the voting outcomes are only reported for 290 proposals in Manifest, 
articles compiled by the Factiva database, and corporate filings9. Of these, 195 were 
submitted in the UK at a total of 62 general meetings of 40 firms between 1998 and 2008. The 
remaining 95 proposals were submitted between 2005 and 2008 at 28 general meetings of 23 
firms in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia and 
Switzerland. 
We collect accounting and stock price data for the target firms from Compustat and 
Datastream. Ownership information is gathered from Manifest and Bureau van Dijk. We use 
the Manifest Governance database and Thomson OneBanker to obtain information on 
governance structures including board composition and CEO ownership and remuneration. 
                                                 
9 The dissemination of the voting results is not compulsory in many European countries including Belgium, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK. Manifest (2008) reports that it has been best practice 
historically in the UK, with the disclosure rate at 96% among the FTSE 250 firms. In Continental Europe, it has 
only recently become common practice even for the largest firms, with the disclosure rate increasing between 
2005 and 2007 from 51% to 100% for the CAC 100 firms in France, and from 68% to 88% for the AEX 25 firms 
in the Netherlands. 
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Preliminary analysis of the 720 submissions reported by Manifest shows that 
shareholder proposals are submitted less frequently in the UK and Continental Europe than in 
the US.  Table 2 compares the frequency of proposal submissions using the US data reported 
by Renneboog and Szilagyi (2009) for the period between 1996 and 2005. We find that 
normalized by the size of the stock markets as reported by the World Bank, the number of 
proposals is 3-4 times as high in the US per publicly listed firm, and approximately twice as 
high per traded stock value and market capitalization. This implies that on the whole, 
shareholder proposals play a lesser role in European corporate governance. 
− Insert Table 2 about here − 
4.1. Proposal objectives 
Table 3 provides an overview of the 290 proposals for which the voting outcomes are 
available by the issue addressed, the year of submission, and whether the target firms was 
from the UK or Continental Europe. We classify the proposal objectives into nine mutually 
exclusive categories: (i) election or removal of directors; (ii) corporate governance issues; (iii) 
pro-management loosening of corporate governance; (iv) asset restructuring; (v) capital 
structure; (vi) payout policy; (vii) corporate social responsibility; (vii) routine issues related to 
the general meeting; and (ix) other miscellaneous issues.  
– Insert Table 3 about here – 
Table 3 shows that 139 out of the 290 sample proposals related to a proxy contest 
seeking the election or removal of board members in order to trigger corporate changes. This 
is in sharp contrast with the US practice, where dissident shareholders cannot nominate or 
remove directors using proxy proposals, thus replacing the board requires a contested 
solicitation. The number of proposals targeting directors was particularly high in the UK in 
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the latter half of the sample period, with 24 submissions up to 2003, and 105 thereafter. 
Buchanan and Yang (2008) point out that this is unsurprising, because UK shareholders can 
replace the board with their own nominees by a simple majority vote. 
While two thirds of the UK proposals targeted the board directly, 65 of the 95 
proposals submitted in Continental Europe were directed at corporate governance issues. In 
line with submissions in the US, a number of these related to board quality and shareholder 
rights. However, 27 of the proposals sought to exert discipline retrospectively by calling for a 
special audit on past matters. In the UK, governance issues were targeted by a total of 21 
proposals. 
It is notable that five of the Continental European submissions favored management or 
the board rather than shareholders, and therefore sought to reinforce rather than discipline 
corporate insiders. These included three proposals (including a resubmission) to limit the 
number of mandates for directors representing shareholders, one to waive claims against 
directors, and a counterproposal on calling a special audit. 
Of the remaining proposals, 21 related to corporate social responsibility issues such as 
employee rights, contacts with customers, and environmental matters. These were submitted 
almost exclusively in the UK, with only three submissions made in Continental Europe. There 
were a total of 11 proposals seeking asset restructuring, 15 called for payout policy changes, 
seven proposals submitted in the UK targeted capital structure issues, and five were directed 
at routine issues associated with the time and location of general meetings. 
 
4.2. Voting outcomes 
Table 4 provides an overview of the voting outcomes by the issue addressed, the year 
of submission, and whether the target firm was from the UK or Continental Europe. The 
number of proposals that actually passed the shareholder vote is shown in Table 5.  
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– Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here – 
Table 4 shows that the proposals submitted in the UK achieved 30.3% of the votes cast 
on average. The voting outcomes improved substantially after 2003, coinciding with the 
results reported for the US by Renneboog and Szilagyi (2009). Continental European 
proposals drew less voting support, with an average 21.1% of the votes. 
In the UK, the proposals seeking the election or removal of directors were by far the 
most successful, with 38.6% of the votes on average. In the period after 2003 many of these 
actually received a majority vote, with as many as 30 out of 37 proposals passing in 2004. 
Although less widely used, similar proposals submitted against Continental European firms 
also fared well, with an average 46.5% of the votes in 2007 and 2008. This indicates that the 
voting shareholders view proposals related to a proxy contest as a strong signal of governance 
concerns. 
The proposals seeking asset restructuring won a similarly high 36.3% of the votes on 
average. These submissions were also more successful in the latter half of the sample period, 
with the majority passing the shareholder vote after 2006 in both the UK and Continental 
Europe. 
The voting outcomes on the remaining proposal objectives were significantly weaker. 
The governance-related proposals won only 15.5% and 19.7% of the votes in the UK and 
Continental Europe, respectively. The five Continental European submissions that favored 
management or the board rather than shareholders drew an average 21.2% voting support. 
The proposals targeting payout policy attracted 16.3% of the votes in the UK, and had little 
success in all but one case in Continental Europe. Consistent with the findings of Gillan and 
Starks (2007) for the US, the proposals related corporate social responsibility received even 
less support, at an average 7.3% of the votes cast. Finally, the proposals targeted at routine 
and capital structure issues achieved 4.6% and 4.3% of the votes, respectively. 
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While management should contest shareholder proposals to the extent that they are 
used as disciplinary tool by the outside shareholders, this was not always the case with the 
sample proposals. Table 5 partitions the voting outcomes by the voting recommendations 
issued by management on the individual submissions. The results show two major differences 
between the UK and Continental Europe. First, while management recommended a no vote on 
186 out of 195 UK submissions, they opposed only 68 of the 95 proposals submitted in 
Continental Europe. Second, we find evidence that the management-supported proposals 
mostly passed the shareholder vote in Continental Europe but were unsuccessful in the UK. 
These results again suggest that in Continental Europe, proposals often reinforce the 
incumbent leadership rather than serve shareholder interests, whereas in the UK any such 
attempts are likely to fail. 
– Insert Table 6 about here – 
4.3. Stock price effects  
To examine the stock price effects of the sample proposals, we analyze the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the general meeting dates. The prior US literature examines 
stock price changes around the dates the proposals are first announced in the proxy statements 
(Bhagat, 1983; Bhagat and Brickley, 1984). However, our cross-country study does not 
permit this type of analysis. On one hand, the content, timing and dissemination methods of 
the materials related to a general meeting show huge variations across countries, with no 
minimum standards even within the European Union. On the other, several countries allow 
proposals to be placed on the meeting’s agenda with a very short notice period. For example, 
Germany allows proposals up to a week after the publication of the meeting’s notice, while 
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France has no provision at all governing the deadline for submitting proposals, such that 
shareholders may do so until the meeting is called to order10. 
By analyzing the CARs around the general meeting dates, we effectively measure the 
stock price reaction to the shareholder vote on the sample proposals, with some probability 
that the market is informed of the submission itself on the day of the meeting. The market 
response to the proposal outcome is difficult to ascertain, which is likely to lead to a 
downward bias in the size and significance of the results. On one hand, even if the market is 
aware of the proposal, it should have reasonable expectations on whether it actually passes, 
thus the voting results only reveal new information if they differ from this projection. On the 
other, shareholders receive a great deal of new information during the meeting as well as vote 
on multiple agenda items, such as director elections, dividend payout, the annual accounts, as 
well as any other proposals submitted by shareholders and management.  
We calculate the CARs using the market model methodology. The model parameters 
are estimated over the 200-day period ending 21 days before the general meeting dates, using 
representative national indices to calculate market returns11. The significance of the CARs is 
tested using Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen’s (1991) standardized cross-sectional Z-test 
and Cowan’s (1992) nonparametric generalized sign test. For robustness, we compute 
bootstrapped versions of the parametric tests with 3000 repetitions. 
Table 7 reports the CARs for the full sample across a number of event windows. The 
results indicate a strong negative market reaction to the general meetings at which the sample 
proposals were voted upon. In the three-day [-1,+1] window around the meeting dates, the 
average and median CAR were -1.20% and -0.71%, respectively, with all tests significant at 
                                                 
10 We try to analyze stock price changes around the date information on the sample proposals first became 
available on Manifest, but the results are inconsistent. 
11 The market indices used are FTSE All Share, DAX30, PSI20, CAC40, AEX, Swiss Market Index [SMI], 
ATX, RTS, Oslo BMI. 
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least at the 5% level. We find similar results for all other event windows. These findings 
imply that the market associates proposals with a negative signal rather than attribute them 
control benefits as a disciplinary device. As Prevost and Rao (2000) argue, the market may 
view proposals as being disruptive from a corporate governance perspective. However, it is 
likely that the stock price effects are driven by the negative signal of both governance 
concerns as well as the failure to address them, because most proposal submissions tend to 
fail the shareholder vote. 
– Insert Table 7 about here – 
Table 8 classifies the CARs by the issues addressed by the proposal submissions. For 
the general meetings where multiple proposals were presented, the CARs are assigned to each 
of the corresponding proposal objectives. While the results are mostly insignificant due to 
sample size issues, the average CARs were negative for each objective across almost all event 
windows. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that the market responds least favorably to 
proposals that seek governance improvements or personal changes on the board, with the 
negative CARs significant in five and two of the eight event windows, respectively. This 
corresponds to the strong governance implications of these proposal objectives, and thus 
supports the assertion that the market assesses proposals, irrespective of their voting success, 
on the severity of the governance problems they signal. 
– Insert Table 8 about here – 
5. Multivariate analysis of target selection, voting outcomes, and stock price effects  
To gain further insight into the governance role of shareholder proposals in Europe, 
we use sample selection models to determine (i) how activists decide which firm to target 
with a proxy proposal, and (ii) conditional on the firm being targeted, what drives proposal 
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success in terms of the voting results and the stock price effects. The use of the sample 
selection models is motivated by the fact that target selection and proposal success are likely 
to be endogenous. On one hand, the activist is likely to consider the potential outcome before 
deciding whether or not to submit the proposal, given the nontrivial costs involved. On the 
other, the market and the voting shareholders may respond to the act of the submission 
beyond the objective of the proposal itself, to the extent that this reveals a negative signal of 
governance concerns, or in fact a positive signal of close monitoring by the activist. 
To identify the firm characteristics that drive target selection and proposal success, we 
use a comprehensive set of accounting, stock market, ownership and governance data 
collected from the AMADEUS, Bankscope, Compustat, Datastream, Manifest, and Thomson 
OneBanker databases, as well as corporate filings. The analysis of target selection is 
performed through a matching process, such that for each target we select a peer within its 
industry that is comparable in size. While this process does not cover the entire universe of 
publicly listed European firms, it decreases the likelihood of a systematic bias due to missing 
or inaccurate data.  
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics on target and non-target firms 
Table 9 compares the descriptive statistics on the target firms and their nontarget 
peers. The variable descriptions are provided in Appendix A. The differences in means and 
medians are tested using paired t-tests and Wilcoxon ranksum tests, respectively. 
− Insert Table 9 about here − 
Panel A of Table 9 shows how the targets and nontargets compared in terms of their 
financial characteristics, market performance, and institutional ownership. Fama and French’s 
(2001) agency proxies show little evidence that governance concerns in the targets were 
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exacerbated, with no discernible difference in the debt-to-equity and market-to-book ratios of 
the targets and the nontargets. The performance data show some evidence that the targets 
underperformed relative to the nontargets in the year up to two months before the general 
meeting dates. Their stocks delivered an average raw return of 5.5%, and underperformed 
their respective market indices by 0.8%. The raw return on the nontarget stocks was 12.2%, 
and these actually outperformed their respective indices by 7.6%. Turnover was considerably 
higher in the target stocks, at 2.6 versus 1.0, which is likely to be symptomatic of shareholders 
voting with their feet. 
Finally, Panel A confirms that there were significant differences in the ownership 
structures of the targets and the nontargets. First, institutional ownership was higher in the 
targets at 33.0% and 21.6%, respectively. Using Pound’s (1988) classification of institutional 
investors, we find that both pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutions held bigger 
ownership stakes in the targets. Second, there is evidence that ownership in the targets was 
more concentrated. We measure shareholder concentration using the independence indicators 
of Bureau van Dijk, and find that the mean concentration in the targets was significantly 
higher, at 1.9 versus 1.612. Overall, there results imply that activists indeed observe the 
identity of the voting shareholders before deciding whether or not to submit proxy proposals. 
Panel B of Table 9 compares the governance quality of the targets and the nontargets 
in terms of board effectiveness and the exposure of CEO wealth to firm performance. We 
measure board effectiveness by (i) size, (ii) the proportion of executive directors, (iii) the 
average age of nonexecutive directors, and (iv) the independence of the board chairman. The 
data show mixed evidence on how the two groups compared in terms of board quality. The 
targets had 12.8 directors on average, significantly more than the 11.4 directors nontargets 
                                                 
12 The independence indicators reported by Bureau van Dijk take values of A, B, C, and D. We transform these 
values into a scale from 1 to 4, with D=4 representing the highest level of ownership concentration. 
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had and the optimal board size of six to eight directors (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). 
However, there is no evidence that the targets had fewer independent directors, with 
executives constituting 36.4% of the board in the targets and 38.0% in the nontargets. We also 
find no discernible difference between the age and thus experience of the nonexecutive 
directors, at 59.3 and 59.9 years, respectively. The posts of CEO and board chairman were 
separated in 12% of the targets and 17% of the nontargets, but the difference is again 
insignificant. 
The exposure of CEO wealth to firm performance, which Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
view as a remedy to agency concerns, is measured by (i) the CEO’s equity ownership and (ii) 
the proportion of stock-based compensation in the CEO’s total pay. Panel B of Table 6 shows 
that the target CEOs held smaller equity stakes in their firm, at 0.7% versus 2.5%. However, 
there is no evidence that CEO compensation was less high-powered in the targets, with 




We perform the multivariate analysis of target selection and proposal success using 
Heckman’s (1979) sample selection model, often referred to as a type-2 tobit model. The 
model is specified as follows: 
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2σ , and 
correlation 12ρ (Amemiya (1984)). The variable
*
1ity  is a dummy variable showing whether firm 
i  is targeted in year t , while the variable *
2ity is the outcome of interest i.e. (i) the voting 
outcome observed at the proposal level, or (ii) the CAR observed at the firm level around the 
proxy mailing date. It is assumed that only the sign of *
1ity is observed, and that 
*
2ity is observed 
only when *
1 0ity > . The X variables correspond to the explanatory variables. 1itX  and 2itX  are 
not disjoint but do differ. 1itX is observed for all i , and includes firm-level variables as well as 
year and industry dummies. 2itX additionally includes proposal-related variables not observed 
when no proposal is submitted i.e. *
1 0ity ≤ . 1β and 2β are vectors of the model coefficients. 
In a standard setting, the error terms are assumed to be i.i.d. drawings. We relax this 
assumption across t  as well as allow the clustering of observations corresponding to a given 
firm i, i.e. we assume the error terms to be i.i.d. across firms but not necessarily for different 
observations within the same firm. This procedure enhances the robustness of our findings 
and allows us to take the panel data structure of our sample explicitly into account. 
Throughout the paper we call Equation (1) the selection equation and Equation (2) the 
outcome equation. As has been discussed, estimating the outcome equation independently 
would not be a valid alternative, because the OLS estimator of 2β is biased when the selection 
of the outcome sample is endogenous i.e. 12 0ρ ≠ . The sample selection model addresses the 





5.3 Target selection 
The sample selection models analyzing the voting outcomes and the stock price effects 
are depicted in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. The selection equations, shown in Panel A, are 
configured identically in the two tables. However, the voting outcomes are observed at the 
proposal rather than the firm level, thus the selection equations of Table 10 overweight the 
targets with multiple proposals in a given year13. As the CARs are observed at the firm level, 
the corresponding selection equations are unbiased. Therefore, the remainder of this section 
discusses the selection equations shown in Panel A of Table 11. 
− Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here − 
The selection equations control for the firm characteristics discussed in Section 5.1 
and described in Appendix A. Fama and French’s (2001) agency argument dictates that the 
probability of a proposal submission is related negatively to the debt-to-equity and market-to-
book ratios. However, market-to-book also serves as a proxy for informational asymmetries, 
thus the sign on this variable can be positive to the extent that proposal submissions have 
signaling effects. Proposal probability should be related negatively to prior stock performance 
and positively to prior stock turnover. We control separately for ownership by pressure-
sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional investors. Proposal probability should increase 
in both, but less so in the former due to the threat of conflicted voting by pressure-sensitive 
institutions. Finally, we expect proposal probability to be positively related to shareholder 
concentration. On one hand, voting coalitions should be easier to build when firm ownership 
                                                 
13 Firm-level specifications would yield unbiased results for the selection equations but lead to considerable loss 
of information on the individual proposals. For robustness, we performed the analysis at the firm level by 
excluding firms targeted by multiple proposals in a given year, as well as by using the average voting outcomes. 
The results of the outcome equations were similar to those presented in Section 4.3, but the information loss was 
significant. 
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is concentrated. On the other, activists may actually be wary of expropriation by powerful 
large shareholders, and use proposal submissions to protect minority shareholder interests. 
The selection equations include seven variables capturing governance quality. Board 
effectiveness is proxied by (i) size, (ii) the square of size, (iii) the proportion of executive 
directors, (iv) the age of nonexecutive directors, and (v) a dummy equal to one if the chairman 
is independent and zero otherwise. We expect the sign on size to be negative and on squared 
size to be positive, to the extent that boards should be neither too small nor too large. The sign 
should be positive on the proportion of executive directors, and negative on director age and 
chairman independence. As before, the variables pertaining to CEO wealth and compensation 
are (i) ownership and (ii) stock-based to total pay. We conjecture that the signs are negative 
on both variables, due to the incentive effects of the CEO’s exposure to firm performance. 
Panel A of Table 11 show that these selection equations are very effective in 
explaining why firms get targeted with shareholder proposals. First, we confirm that proposal 
probability decreases in the prior market performance and increases in the prior stock 
turnover. Second, we find that highly levered firms are less likely to be targeted, consistent 
with the role of leverage in mitigating free cash flow problems. And third, there is evidence 
that activists observe the voting shareholders before deciding whether or not to submit proxy 
proposals. In Model 5, proposal probability increases by 3.3% and 2.3% for every 1% stock 
held by pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutions, respectively. While this shows 
little indication of conflicted voting by pressure-sensitive investors, the statistical relation is 
considerably more significant for pressure-insensitive institutions. We find no statistical 
evidence that proposal probability is affected by the additional proxies for governance quality; 
the variables capturing board effectiveness and the exposure of CEO wealth to firm 
performance are insignificant in the models. 
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5.4 Voting outcomes 
The outcome equations analyzing voting success are depicted in Panel B of Table 10 
and summarized in Appendix B. The models incorporate a similar set of firm-level variables 
included in the selection equations. While the voting outcomes are conditional on the target 
selection process, we conjecture that the variables affect proposal probability and voting 
success in the same way. We additionally control for firm size in the outcome equations using 
the log of assets, and exclude shareholder concentration to avoid endogeneity problems. We 
expect that voting success is related negatively to firm size, because while Fama and French 
(2001) find agency concerns to be more severe in large firms with dispersed ownership, 
voting coalitions should be much more difficult to build. 
In addition to the firm-level variables, the outcome equations include 11 variables 
capturing the characteristics of the proposals themselves. Times submitted is the number of 
times a proposal has been submitted in consecutive years. We conjecture that consecutive 
resubmissions of unimplemented proposals improve the voting outcomes, consistent with the 
earlier findings of Gillan and Starks (2000) and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2009) for the US. 
Number of proposals at meeting captures the number of proposals presented at the same 
general meeting. While it is not immediate how this should affect voting success, we expect 
that the more proposals submitted, the greater the support from the voting shareholders due to 
the stronger signal conveyed over governance concerns. Finally, we use nine dummy 
variables to control for the proposal objectives. All proposals are uniquely allocated to an 
issue type, such that the intercept represents proposals addressing routine issues. 
Corresponding to our univariate results, we expect that proposals seeking personal changes on 
the board attract the most voting support. 
The model statistics in Table 9 confirm that target selection and voting success are 
endogenous, with ρ  sensitive to the model specification but significant in all but one case. 
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Results not reported here show that independent analysis of the voting outcomes produces 
somewhat different parameter estimates and has lower explanatory power overall. These 
findings confirm that the voting success of shareholder proposals needs to be analyzed in a 
sample selection framework. 
The results in Panel B of Table 10 confirm that the voting outcomes are largely driven 
by the proposal objectives. In Model 5, the intercept shows that routine proposals receive 
9.2% of the votes cast. In comparison, proposals seeking to elect or remove directors win 
21.8% and 20.6% more voting support, respectively, which is consistent with the strong 
signaling implications of outright proxy contests. We find no evidence that routine proposals 
are outperformed by other submissions, including those calling for asset restructuring, with 
the exception of the single miscellaneous proposal seeking to assert damage claims. The 
results also show no indication that consecutive resubmissions of the same proposal or 
multiple submissions at the same general meeting affect the voting outcomes. 
Despite the careful target selection process we documented earlier, the firm-level 
variables add significant explanatory power to the outcome equations.  Beyond its impact on 
the selection decision, institutional ownership has no discernible effect on the voting 
outcomes. Surprisingly, however, we find that voting success conditional on target selection 
increases rather than decreases in the target’s prior market performance and debt-to-equity 
and market-to-book ratios. This implies that the voting shareholders view submissions against 
less likely targets as a negative signal of governance problems. Of the governance-related 
variables, only the CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity affects the voting outcomes. The 
relation between the two is negative, which shows that the CEO’s exposure to firm 




5.5. Stock price effects 
The outcome equations analyzing the stock price effects in the days [-1,+1] around the 
general meeting dates are shown in Panel B of Table 11 and summarized in Appendix B. We 
control for the same firm characteristics included in the outcomes equations pertaining to the 
voting results, and conjecture that the variables affect the CARs in a similar way. The only 
exception is firm size, which should be related positively rather than negatively to the CARs. 
This conjecture assumes that while submissions against large firms are likely to win less 
voting support, their control benefits are greater to the extent due to agency considerations. 
As the CARS are observed at the firm rather than the proposal level, the dummies 
controlling for the proposal objectives are now equal to one if a corresponding proposal was 
presented at the general meeting and zero otherwise. We conjecture that in line with their 
signaling effects, proposals seeking personal changes on the board generate more negative 
stock price changes. We similarly expect that the CARs are related negatively to the Number 
of proposals at meeting variable, to the extent that multiple submissions signal greater 
governance concerns. 
The model statistics in Table 11 show that the outcome equations have considerable 
explanatory power, even though we measure the response to the general meetings rather than 
the individual proposals. Similar to Renneboog and Szilagyi (2009), we find no evidence that 
the CARs are endogenous to target selection, but as with the voting outcomes, independent 
regressions are less powerful and produce slightly different parameter estimates. 
The outcome equations in Panel B of Table 11 show only limited evidence that the 
negative market reaction to general meetings is driven by the objectives of the proposals 
presented. The intercept representing routine proposals is insignificantly negative across all 
model specifications. In Model 5, the dummy capturing proposals to loosen governance 
quality is significantly positive. This implies that ceteris paribus, the market responds well to 
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submissions that attempt and fail to relax governance standards, and thereby indicate 
considerable shareholder dissent vis-à-vis management. The remaining dummies, including 
those pertaining to proposals that seek governance improvements or personal changes on the 
board, are statistically insignificant. However, we confirm that the CARs are related 
negatively to the number of proposals presented, in line with the signaling effects of multiple 
submissions. 
The model statistics show that the stock price effects are most fundamentally driven 
by Fama and French’s (2001) agency proxies and the target’s prior market performance. The 
CARs are less negative for large firms with low leverage, indicating that the market attributes 
at least some control benefits to the public vote on shareholder proposals in the presence of 
agency concerns. However, they increase rather than decrease in both the market-to-book 
ratio and the prior stock price performance. This is inconsistent with the role of shareholder 
proposals as a disciplinary device, because it shows that the proposal outcomes only intensify 
the market’s concerns over firms that have previously underperformed. 
The results in Panel B of Table 11 provide some support for the relevance of the 
target’s governance structures in explaining the stock price effects. There is evidence that the 
CARs show the expected nonlinear relation with the number of directors, with board size 
significantly positive and the square of board size insignificantly negative in the final Model 
5. It is notable, however, that the relation between the CARs and the CEO’s pay-performance 
sensitivity is positive rather than negative. This again is inconsistent with the control function 
of shareholder proposals, in that it indicates that governance concerns over firms with ill-






While the control function of shareholder proposals as a disciplinary mechanism has 
been subject to much debate in the US academic literature, their role in European corporate 
governance is rarely discussed. There is evidence for the US that shareholder access to the 
proxy has nontrivial control benefits, and shareholder proposals should be regarded as a 
useful disciplinary tool and the proposal sponsors as valuable monitoring agents. In Europe, 
the empirical investigation of this issue has been complicated by data availability, as well as 
the fact that European countries are very diverse in terms of their legal provisions governing 
shareholder access to the proxy, corporate ownership structures, as well as the monitoring 
incentives and costs borne by proposal sponsors. 
This paper has contributed to the shareholder activism literature by examining 
shareholder proposals across eight European countries for the first time. The results have 
shown that relative to the US, proposal submissions remain less frequent in Continental 
Europe in particular. The importance of regulation is shown by the fact that while UK 
activists conveniently use proposals in relation to a proxy contest to replace the board, the 
proposal objectives remain largely limited to specific governance issues in Continental 
Europe. 
Despite these country-level differences, proposal success in terms of the voting results 
and the stock price effects remain limited across Europe irrespective of the issues addressed. 
In fact, proposals are met with significantly negative market reactions when they are put to 
vote at general meetings. This implies that rather than attribute proposals meaningful control 
benefits, the market often interprets the shareholder vote as a negative signal of governance 
concerns. Indeed, although voting success and the stock price effects are both affected by 
agency considerations, the market responds particularly negatively to proposals submitted 
against firms that have already underperformed.  
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Overall, it is unclear why the perceived control benefits of shareholder proposals are 
limited in Europe. Previous US studies propose that submissions can do more damage than 
good by disrupting the board’s authority, and that the proposal sponsors pursue their selfish 
agendas rather than maximize shareholder value. However, we have shown that proposal 
submissions are preceded by a careful selection process, whereby activists target firms that 
both underperform and are subject to governance concerns. Whether this translates into long-
term improvements in operating performance is left for future research. 
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Table 1. Statutory requirements on requisitioning an extraordinary general meeting and submitting shareholder proposals. 
Country LLSV origin EGM Remark Proposal Remark 
Austria German 5%  5%  
France French 0.5-5% this fraction can demand appointment of 
court representative to convene EGM 
0.5-5% decreasing in firm size 
Germany German 5%  5% or ownership of EUR 500,000              
in nominal value 
any shareholder if related to already 
existing agenda items 
Netherlands French 10%  1% or share ownership of EUR 50 million 
in market value 
 
Norway Scandinavian 5%  any shareholder  
Portugal French 5%  5%  
Russia other 10%  2% specific to sample firm 
Switzerland German 10%  share ownership of CHF 1 million              
in market value 
firm-specific information also 
available 
UK English 10%  5% or a group of 100 shareholders with 
shares of GBP 100 each 
automatically if meeting convened 




Table 2. Shareholder proposals by geographic location and stock market size. 
This table shows the number of shareholder proposals submitted in the UK, Continental Europe, and the US. The 
proxies for stock market size are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indices. *: from  
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2009). 
 








per USD trillion 
of traded stock 
value 
per USD trillion 
of market 
capitalization 
UK 1998-2008 362 32.9 0.0140 8.39 11.40 
Continental Europe 2005-2008 358 89.5 0.0117 5.80 7.19 




Table 3. Shareholder proposals by issue addressed, geographic location, and year of submission. 
UK  Continental Europe 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total by 
issue 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total by 
issue 
Elect/remove - 11 - 1 10 2 37 16 19 27 6 129  Elect/remove - - 5 5 10 
Elect director - 4 - 1 4 1 10 6 14 15 3 58  Elect director - - 3 2 5 
Remove director - 7 - - 6 1 27 10 5 12 3 71  Remove director - - 2 3 5 
Corporate governance 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 1 - 2 3 21  Corporate governance 1 5 31 34 65 
Reduce director power - - - - - - - - - 1 2 3  Reduce director power - - 1 - 1 
Director independence - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1  Board size - - 2 - 2 
Director ownership - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1  Board liability - - 3 - 3 
Board liability - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1  Age limit for directors - - 2 - 2 
Board representation - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1  
Elect committee/special 
representative - 2 - 6 8 
Enfranchise non-voting 
shares - 1 1 - 1 - - - - - - 3  
Shareholder right to 
comment - - 2 - 2 
Reincorporation in US - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1  Special audit - 1 12 14 27 
Convene EGM 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - 2  Verbatim minutes - - 2 2 4 
Remove auditor - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1  Voting issues 1 - 3 1 5 
Other 1 1 1 - 2 - - 1 - - 1 7  Other - 2 4 5 11 
Corporate governance - 
loosening - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Corporate governance - 
loosening - - 2 3 5 
              Waive board liability - - - 1 1 
              
Limit shareholder 
representation - - 2 1 3 
              
Counterproposal - special 
audit - - - 1 1 
Asset restructuring - - 1 3 1 - - - 1 - 1 7  Asset restructuring - - 3 1 4 
Capital structure 4 - - - - - - - - 3 - 7  Capital structure - - - - - 
Payout policy - 2 1 4 4 - - - - - - 11  Payout policy - 1 2 1 4 
Corporate social 
responsibility - 1 2 2 1 1 4 2 2 2 1 18  
Corporate social 
responsibility - - 3 - 3 
Routine - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 2  Routine - - 3 - 3 
Other - - - - - - - - - - - -  Other - - 1 - 1 
Total by year 6 16 7 13 20 4 43 19 22 34 11 195  Total by year 1 6 50 38 95 
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Table 4. Percentage of votes FOR shareholder proposals by issue addressed, geographic region, and year of submission. 
  UK  
 
Continental Europe 





2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total by 
issue 
Elect/remove  - 29.3 - 18.9 23.3 19.5 54.2 38.6 42.1 25.2 30.6 38.0   - - 44.8 48.2 46.5 
   (11)  (1) (10) (2) (37) (16) (19) (27) (6) (129)     (5) (5) (10) 
     Elect director  - 29.1 - 18.9 21.2 35.3 60.9 34.3 38.8 28.8 29.1 36.8   - - 72.7 69.6 71.5 
   (4)  (1) (4) (1) (10) (6) (14) (15) (3) (58)     (3) (2) (5) 
     Remove director  - 29.4 - - 24.7 3.7 51.6 41.2 51.4 20.8 32.0 39.5   - - 3.0 33.9 21.5 
   (7)   (6) (1) (27) (10) (5) (12) (3) (70)     (2) (3) (5) 
 14.5 17.0 22.1 9.1 14.6 10.8 3.0 1.9 - 3.1 66.0 19.7   7.3 39.4 8.9 18.8 15.5 Corporate governance 
 (2) (2) (3) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1)  (2) (3) (21)   (1) (5) (31) (28) (65) 
Corporate governance – loosening  - - - - - - - - - - - -   - - 2.7 33.5 21.2 
                  (2) (3) (5) 
Asset restructuring  - - 15.0 10.2 7.7 - - - 95.2 - 66.0 30.6   - - 60.1 5.3 46.4 
    (1) (3) (1)    (1)  (1) (7)     (3) (1) (4) 
Capital structure  4.0 - - - - - - - - 4.6 - 4.3   - - - - - 
  (4)         (3)  (7)        
Payout policy  - 17.9 23.2 17.3 12.8 - - - - - - 16.3   - 0.3 19.0 99.5 34.4 
   (2) (1) (4) (4)       (11)    (1) (2) (1) (4) 
Corporate social responsibility  - 19.1 15.2 3.2 10.3 5.9 8.4 4.2 6.0 5.8 8.9 8.1   - - 2.0 - 2.0 
   (1) (2) (2) (1) (1) (4) (2) (2) (2) (1) (18)     (3)  (3) 
Routine  - - - 3.5 14.1 - - - - - - 8.8   - - 1.8 - 1.8 
     (1) (1)       (2)     (3)  (3) 
Other  - - - - - - - - - - - -   - - 93.3 - 93.3 
                  (1)  (1) 
Total by year   7.5 25.7 19.3 11.3 18.0 13.9 47.5 33.1 41.3 21.0 41.5 30.3   7.3 32.9 16.5 25.6 21.1 
  (6) (16) (7) (13) (20) (4) (43) (19) (22) (34) (11) (195)   (1) (6) (50) (38) (95) 
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Table 5. Number of passed shareholder proposals by issue addressed, geographic region, and year of submission. 
This table shows the number of shareholder proposals that received a majority vote. The total number of proposals submitted is shown in parentheses. 
  UK  
 
Continental Europe 
Year   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 




2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total by 
issue 
Elect/remove  - 0 - 0 0 0 30 4 8 3 0 45   - - 2 1 3 
   (11)  (1) (10) (2) (37) (16) (19) (27) (6) (129)     (5) (5) (10) 
     Elect director  - 0 - 0 0 0 10 1 4 3 0 18   - - 2 1 3 
   (4)  (1) (4) (1) (10) (6) (14) (15) (3) (58)     (3) (2) (5) 
     Remove director  - 0 - - 0 0 20 3 4 0 0 27   - - 0 0 0 
   (7)   (6) (1) (27) (10) (5) (12) (3) (70)     (2) (3) (5) 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 3 3   0 2 2 3 7 Corporate governance 
 (2) (2) (3) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1)  (2) (3) (21)   (1) (5) (31) (28) (65) 
Corporate governance – loosening  - - - - - - - - - - - -   - - 0 1 1 
                  (2) (3) (5) 
Asset restructuring  - - 0 0 0 - - - 1 - 1 2   - - 2 0 2 
    (1) (3) (1)    (1)  (1) (7)     (3) (1) (4) 
Capital structure  0 - - - - - - - - 0 - 0   - - - - - 
  (4)         (3)  (7)        
Payout policy  - 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - 0   - 0 0 1 1 
   (2) (1) (4) (4)       (11)    (1) (2) (1) (4) 
Corporate social responsibility  - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   - - 0 - 0 
   (1) (2) (2) (1) (1) (4) (2) (2) (2) (1) (18)     (3)  (3) 
Routine  - - - 0 0 - - - - - - 0   - - 0 - 0 
     (1) (1)       (2)     (3)  (3) 
Other  - - - - - - - - - - - -   - - 1 - 1 
                  (1)  (1) 
Total by year   0 0 0 0 0 0 30 4 9 3 4 50   0 2 7 6 15 
  (6) (16) (7) (13) (20) (4) (43) (19) (22) (34) (11) (195)   (1) (6) (50) (38) (95) 
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Table 6. Percentage of votes FOR shareholder proposals by issue addressed, geographic location, and management recommendation.  
 UK   Continental Europe 
Management recommendation Against Case-by-case For Total by issue   Against Case-by-case For Total by issue 
 Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N)   Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) Mean (N) 
Elect/remove 38.4 (125) 32.0 (3) 2.9 (1) 38.0 (129)   26.0 (4) 3.7 (1) 71.5 (5) 46.5 (10) 
     Elect director 36.8 (58) -  -  36.8 (58)   -  -  71.5 (5) 71.5 (5) 
     Remove director 39.8 (67) 32.0 (3) 2.9 (1) 39.0 (71)   26.0 (4) 3.7 (1) -  21.5 (5) 
Corporate governance 21.5 (19) -  3.0 (2) 19.7 (21)   6.7 (49) 8.7 (4) 53.7 (12) 15.5 (65) 
Corporate governance - loosening -  -  -  -    3.3 (3) -  48.1 (2) 21.2 (5) 
Asset restructuring 19.8 (6) -  95.2 (1) 30.6 (7)   46.4 (4) -  -  46.4 (4) 
Capital structure 4.3 (7) -  -  4.3 (7)   -  -  -  -  
Payout policy 16.3 (11) -  -  16.3 (11)   19.0 (2) -  49.9 (2) 34.4 (4) 
Corporate social responsibility 8.5 (16) -  5.4 (2) 8.1 (18)   2.0 (3) -  -  2.0 (3) 
Routine 8.8 (2) -  -  8.8 (2)   1.8 (3) -  -  1.8 (3) 
Other -  -  -  -    93.3 (1) -  -  93.3 (1) 




Table 7. Cumulative abnormal returns around general meeting dates. 
This table shows percent cumulative abnormal returns around general meeting dates. Market model parameters 
are estimated over the 200-day period ending 21 days before the date of the general meeting, using the 
appropriate national stock exchange index. The significance of means is tested using a cross-sectional t-test, 
Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen’s (1991) standardized cross-sectional Z-test, as well as bootstrapped versions 
of both. Bootstrap simulations are performed with 3000 repetitions. The significance of medians is tested using 
Cowan’s (1992) generalized sign test. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
Positive: Bootstrapped Event 
window 






[-1,+1] 90 -1.227 -0.713 34:56 -2.81*** -2.81*** -1.79** 
[-1,0] 90 -0.906 -0.418 36:54 -1.87* -1.87** -1.36* 
[0,+1] 90 -0.761 -0.103 41:49 -2.14** -2.14** -0.31 
[-2,+2] 90 -1.142 -0.628 34:56 -2.65*** -2.65*** -1.79** 
[-1,+5] 90 -1.323 -1.256 34:56 -2.65*** -2.65*** -1.79** 
[-1,+7] 90 -1.584 -1.326 38:52 -2.64*** -2.64*** -0.95 
[-5,+5] 90 -1.603 -1.016 36:54 -2.53** -2.53*** -1.36* 




Table 8. Cumulative abnormal returns by issue addressed. 
The significance of means is tested using Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen's (1991) standardized cross-sectional 
Z-test. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. 
 
  N [-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-2,+2] [-1,+5] [-1,+7] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
Elect/remove 42 -1.28 -1.25 -0.68 -0.92 -2.20* -2.78** -2.60 -3.51 
Corporate governance 33 -1.09 -0.59 -0.61 -1.81** -0.80* -0.96** -0.71* -1.23** 
Corporate governance - loosening 5 -2.52 -0.12 -2.29 -4.53* -2.87 -4.14 -2.62 -2.90 
Asset restructuring 8 -1.73 -1.39 -1.40 -3.14 4.16 3.97 3.83 5.93 
Capital structure 2 -0.43 -0.75 -0.12 -1.97 -3.54 -0.81 -3.05 -2.16 
Payout policy 12 -0.57 -1.03 -1.34 -0.28 -1.99 0.82 1.04 -0.23 
Corporate social responsibility 18 -0.32 -0.06 -0.07 -0.57 -0.95 -0.34 -1.13 0.30 
Routine 4 -2.12 -1.08 -1.21 -2.89 -5.75 -5.98 -5.80 -3.28 
Other 1 -0.11 -0.37 -0.72 -1.09 -1.08 -0.16 -0.11 -1.07 
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Table 9. Descriptive statistics of target and nontarget firms. 
    Targets     Nontargets   





Panel A: Financial, performance and ownership characteristics 
Assets (GBP millions) 90 53,581 1,390 142,689  89 94,881 3,593 265,195 -41,301 * -2,202 
Sales (GBP millions) 90 16,204 392 47,590  89 12,820 2,075 22,041 3,384 -1,683* 
Debt-to-equity ratio 90 2.41 0.64 5.18  89 2.48 0.78 4.28 -0.07 -0.13 
Market-to-book ratio 90 2.44 1.65 2.28  89 2.14 1.62 1.80 0.30 0.03 
Prior one-year raw stock return (%) 90 5.46 4.80 38.34  89 12.24 10.95 55.14 -6.78 -6.15 
Prior one-year abnormal stock return (%) 90 -0.77 -1.84 34.27  89 7.55 0.98 50.05 -8.32 -2.82 
Prior one-year stock turnover 90 2.62 1.37 8.43  89 0.98 0.73 0.94 1.64 * 0.64*** 
Institutional ownership (%) 90 32.98 25.24 24.72  89 21.60 19.90 17.68 11.37 *** 5.34*** 
Institutional ownership - pressure sensitive (%) 90 6.34 0.00 15.12  89 3.35 0.00 5.22 2.99 * 0.00 
Institutional ownership - pressure insensitive (%) 90 26.70 19.00 23.10  89 18.25 10.76 17.97 8.45 ** 8.24** 
Shareholder concentration 90 1.88 1.00 1.27  89 1.55 1.00 0.93 0.33 * 0.00 
Panel B: Governance characteristics 
Board size 90 12.83 12.00 6.98  89 11.43 10.00 5.92 1.40 *** 2.00** 
Executive directors (%) 90 36.39 37.50 18.45  89 38.00 36.08 0.17 36.01 37.14 
Average age of nonexecutive directors 90 59.35 58.88 4.69  89 59.91 59.98 5.40 -0.56 -1.10 
Separate chair and CEO (binary) 90 0.88 1.00 0.33  89 0.83 1.00 0.38 0.04 0.00 
CEO ownership (%) 90 0.74 0.01 3.28  89 2.50 0.04 8.05 -1.76 * -0.04*** 
Stock-based to total CEO compensation (%) 90 30.83 27.46 30.31  89 27.61 24.45 28.63 3.22 3.01 
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Table 10. Sample selection models explaining proposal probability and voting outcomes. 
Panel A shows selection equations where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a shareholder proposal was submitted and zero otherwise. In the outcome 
equations of Panel B, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes cast in favor of the proposal. The firm-level independent variables included in both Panels A and B are 
described in Appendix A. The proposal-level independent variables in Panel B are dummies equal to one if the variable description holds and zero otherwise. Log of assets is 
the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Wald χ2 tests the joint significance of the selection and outcome equations. ρ = 0 tests the independence of the selection and 
outcome equations using a Wald χ2 test. T-statistics use standard errors with White (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering of observations on each 
firm. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5 
  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat 
Panel A:  Selection equations 
Intercept 0.857  1.63  1.950  1.55  2.516* 1.95  2.6186  1.54  2.64 ** 2.15
Debt-to-equity -0.003 -0.14 -0.051 -1.64 -0.077** -2.48 -0.077** -2.13 -0.079 *** -2.74
Market-to-book -0.107** -2.43 -0.097** -2.20 -0.103** -2.01 -0.131* -1.72 -0.129 *** -2.56
Prior one-year abnormal stock return 0.029 0.13 -0.216 -1.10 -0.506*** -3.03 -0.500* -1.89 -0.482 *** -2.78
Prior one-year stock turnover 0.317** 2.48 0.685*** 6.77 0.653*** 6.38 0.684*** 4.33 0.669 *** 7.06
Institutional ownership – pressure sensitive 2.258 1.56 3.579** 2.25 3.365* 1.88 3.166 1.43 3.568 ** 2.17
Institutional ownership – pressure insensitive 0.822* 1.71 1.814*** 3.83 1.714*** 3.27 1.793** 2.33 1.811 *** 3.44
Shareholder concentration     0.174* 1.95 0.174* 1.64 0.166 1.34 0.166 * 1.68
Board size         0.005  0.06  -0.030  -0.38  0.040  0.30  0.027   0.32
Board size squared     0.004* 1.68 0.006** 2.27 0.004 0.94 0.004 1.64
Executive directors     1.260** 2.13 1.305* 1.93 1.024 1.25 1.017 1.39
Average age of nonexecutive directors     -0.029* -1.92 -0.031* -1.94 -0.034 -1.14 -0.033 ** -1.99
Separate chair and CEO     0.506** 2.22 0.435* 1.75 0.377 1.07 0.380 * 1.65
CEO ownership     -1.123 -0.56 -1.480 -0.69 -1.152 -0.42 -1.112 -0.52
Stock-based to total CEO compensation     -0.099 -0.25 0.042 0.10 0.311 0.67 0.315 0.96
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Table 10. Sample selection models explaining proposal probability and voting outcomes (continued). 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5 
  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat 
Panel B:  Outcome equations 
Intercept 0.176* 1.82  0.170  1.52  0.142  0.78  0.324 1.31  0.092  0.28
Times submitted 0.006 0.23 0.003 0.09 -0.016 -0.89     -0.021 -1.28
Number of proposals at meeting -0.005  -0.66  -0.008  -1.05  -0.007  -1.46          -0.007  -1.04
Elect director 0.278*** 4.23 0.305*** 4.14 0.290*** 4.72     0.218*** 2.63
Remove director 0.271*** 3.73 0.297*** 3.64 0.280*** 4.53     0.206*** 2.57
Corporate governance 0.094 1.52 0.110 1.60 0.051 0.98     0.081 1.37
Corporate governance - loosening 0.165 0.95 0.170 0.95 0.118 0.67     0.183 1.02
Asset restructuring 0.234** 2.08 0.255** 2.10 0.098 1.08     0.105 1.16
Capital structure -0.087* -1.75 -0.050 -0.97 -0.043 -0.90     0.008 0.12
Payout policy 0.086 1.09 0.102 1.31 0.060 0.88     0.055 0.70
Corporate social responsibility -0.029 -0.60 -0.007 -0.12 -0.016 -0.37     0.007 0.11
Other 0.769*** 11.25  0.784*** 10.80  0.713*** 3.82          0.675*** 3.06
Log of assets         -0.002 -0.19 0.010 0.95 0.011 1.03
Debt-to-equity         0.018*** 2.79 0.018*** 4.20 0.018*** 4.02
Market-to-book         0.003 0.29 0.036*** 3.08 0.025* 1.90
Prior one-year abnormal stock return         0.239*** 3.57 0.250*** 5.54 0.250*** 4.78
Prior one-year stock turnover         -0.002 -0.92 -0.002 -1.59 -0.002 -1.63
Institutional ownership – pressure sensitive         -0.006 -0.03 0.318** 2.12 0.094 0.43
Institutional ownership – pressure insensitive         0.161 1.59 0.069 0.63 0.028 0.34
Board size                         -0.029  -1.36  -0.032  -1.15
Board size squared             0.000 0.64 0.001 0.75
Executive directors             -0.045 -0.33 0.077 0.52
Average age of nonexecutive directors             0.000 0.03 0.002 0.51
Separate chair and CEO             0.061 1.45 0.051 0.96
CEO ownership             0.664 1.54 0.092 0.17
Stock-based to total CEO compensation                         -0.306*** -4.27  -0.223*** -2.66
Number of observations 380   380   380   380   380 
Number of uncensored observations 290  290  290  290  290 
Number of proposals 290   290   290   290   290 
Wald χ2 5170.69***   2248.52***   4540.54***   189.28***   7065.09*** 
Log-likelihood -153.014  -105.014  -66.403  -57.136  -38.137 
ρ -0.597***   -0.641**   -0.457   -0.521**   -0.495** 
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Table 11. Sample selection models explaining proposal probability and cumulative abnormal returns. 
Panel A shows selection equations where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a shareholder proposal was submitted and zero otherwise. In the outcome 
equations of Panel B, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in the days [-1;+1] surrounding the date of the general meeting where the proposal was 
presented. Market model parameters are estimated over the 200-day period ending 20 days before the date of the general meeting, using country-specific stock market indices. 
The firm-level independent variables included in both Panels A and B are described in Appendix A. The proposal-level independent variables in Panel B are dummies equal to 
one if the variable description holds and zero otherwise. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Wald χ2 tests the joint significance of the selection 
and outcome equations. ρ = 0 tests the independence of the selection and outcome equations using a Wald χ2 test. T-statistics use standard errors with White (1980) correction 
for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering of observations on each firm. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5 
  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat 
Panel A:  Selection equations 
Intercept -0.569  -0.96  0.219  0.16  -0.232  -0.20  -0.146   -0.08  -0.162  -0.13
Debt-to-equity -0.042* -1.86 -0.045 -0.37 -0.038 -0.83 -0.066 -1.08 -0.069** -2.02
Market-to-book 0.008 0.17 -0.054 -0.57 -0.024 -0.40 -0.039 -0.64 -0.036 -0.89
Prior one-year abnormal stock return -0.229 -1.20 -0.481** -2.40 -0.385** -2.22 -0.302 -0.50 -0.379** -2.02
Prior one-year stock turnover 0.346*** 3.20 0.438 1.21 0.316** 2.32 0.4572 1.21 0.494*** 4.10
Institutional ownership – pressure sensitive 2.116 1.45 2.911 1.70 2.697** 2.48 3.588 1.16 3.331** 2.18
Institutional ownership – pressure insensitive 1.290*** 2.75 2.113** 2.25 1.387*** 3.04 2.3745 *** 2.64 2.298*** 5.63
Shareholder concentration     0.301*** 2.79 0.178 1.11 0.347 0.98 0.310** 2.41
Board size     0.077 1.01  
omitted to attain 
convergence 
 0.056 0.38 0.063  0.76
Board size squared     0.001 0.54  omitted to attain 
convergence 
 0.002 0.49 0.002  0.75
Executive directors     0.664 0.47 0.239 0.27 0.994 0.98 0.989 1.21
Average age of nonexecutive directors     -0.016 -0.66 -0.007 -0.42 -0.021 -0.72 -0.019 -1.18
Separate chair and CEO     0.277 0.73 0.138 0.56 0.282 0.64 0.256 0.93
CEO ownership     -1.548 -0.76 -2.010 -0.69 -0.659 -0.25 -0.787 -0.36
Stock-based to total CEO compensation     0.413 1.24 0.253 0.49 0.686 0.55 0.565 1.51
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Table 11. Sample selection models explaining proposal probability and cumulative abnormal returns (continued). 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5 
  Coefficient T-stat  Coefficient T-stat  Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat 
Panel B:  Outcome equations 
Intercept -0.000  -0.12  -0.030  -0.9  -0.087* -1.73  -0.049  -0.62  -0.019  -0.27
Number of proposals at meeting -0.005* -1.78  -0.005* -1.73  -0.005** -2.29         -0.004* -1.85
Elect director 0.003 0.18 0.007 0.27 0.003 0.12     -0.006 -0.41
Remove director 0.026* 1.77 0.027 1.39 0.038** 2.14     0.020 1.21
Corporate governance 0.019 1.51 0.012 0.43 0.020 1.39     0.018 1.21
Corporate governance - loosening 0.023 1.25 0.019 1.00 0.023 1.22     0.042*** 2.73
Asset restructuring 0.001 0.03 0.006 0.27 0.025 1.41     0.012 0.74
Capital structure 0.015 0.72 0.030* 1.84 0.020 0.98     0.015 0.64
Payout policy 0.017 0.94 0.012 0.30 0.017 1.12     0.017 1.03
Corporate social responsibility 0.024* 1.72 0.019 0.59 0.015 0.96     0.000 0.01
Other 0.003  0.16  0.033  0.66  -0.000  -0.02         -0.025  -1.07
Log of assets         0.004** 2.40 0.003 1.08 0.005** 2.49
Debt-to-equity         -0.003** -2.33 -0.002 -0.96 -0.003*** -2.65
Market-to-book         0.004* 1.83 0.004 0.82 0.004** 2.15
Prior one-year abnormal stock return         0.020 1.29 0.027 0.67 0.029** 2.11
Prior one-year stock turnover         -0.001 -0.25 0.001 0.38 0.000 0.59
Institutional ownership – pressure sensitive         -0.002 -0.03 0.039 0.65 0.036 1.14
Institutional ownership – pressure insensitive         0.009 0.25 0.056 0.88 0.033 1.37
Board size                       -0.000  -0.06  -0.005* -1.8
Board size squared             0.000 -0.06 0.000 1.34
Executive directors             0.038 0.66 0.029 1.34
Average age of nonexecutive directors             -0.001 -0.53 -0.001 -1.17
Separate chair and CEO             -0.002 -0.18 0.008 0.64
CEO ownership             0.221 0.61 0.173 0.98
Stock-based to total CEO compensation                       0.037* 1.75  0.039** 2.07
Number of observations 180   180   180   180   180 
Number of uncensored observations 90  90  90  90  90 
Number of firms 124   124   124   124   124 
Wald χ2 10.23   14.88   44.67***   50.17***   77.00*** 
Log-likelihood 57.163  74.152  71.373  85.334  93.311 
ρ -0.615   0.539   -0.265   0.568   0.207 
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Appendix A. Variable descriptions. 
 
Variable name Description and source 
Panel A: Financial, performance and ownership characteristics 
Assets ($ millions) The book value of total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Sales ($ millions) The value of total net sales. Source: Compustat. 
Debt-to-equity ratio Total debt divided by the book value of equity. Source: Compustat. 
Market-to-book ratio Market capitalization of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
Source: Compustat. 
Prior one-year raw stock return The dividend-adjusted stock price return in the year up to two months 
before the general meeting date. Source: Datastream. 
Prior one-year abnormal 
stock return 
The dividend-adjusted stock price return minus the return on the 
appropriate national stock exchange index, in the year up to two months 
before the general meeting date. Source: Datastream. 
Prior one-year stock turnover The total number of shares sold during the year up to two months before 
the general meeting date, divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. Source: Datastream and Compustat. 
Institutional ownership The number of shares held by institutions, divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding. Source: Manifest, Bureau van Dijk and annual 
reports. 
Institutional ownership – 
pressure sensitive 
The number of shares held by banks and insurance companies, divided by 
the total number of shares outstanding. Source: Manifest, Bureau van 
Dijk and annual reports 
Institutional ownership – 
pressure insensitive 
The number of shares held by pension and labor union funds, investment 
funds and their managers, independent investment advisors, and 
university endowments, divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. Source: Manifest, Bureau van Dijk and annual reports. 
Shareholder concentration An independence index indicating ownership concentration. 1: no 
shareholder with ownership over 25% ( direct or total). 2: no shareholder 
with ownership over 50% (direct or total), but one or more shareholders 
with ownership over 25%. 3: shareholder is ultimate owner with 
ownership over 50% (direct or total). 4: shareholder is ultimate owner 
with direct ownership over 50%. Source: Bureau van Dijk. 
Panel B: Corporate governance characteristics 
Board size The number of directors on the board of directors. Source: Manifest, 
Thomson OneBanker and annual reports. 
Executive directors The number of directors employed by the firm, divided by total board 
size. Source: Manifest, Thomson OneBanker and annual reports. 
Average age of nonexecutive directors The average age of directors not employed by the firm. Source: Manifest, 
Thomson OneBanker and annual reports. 
Separate chair and CEO A dummy variable equal to one if the chairman of the board and the CEO 
are different persons, and 0 otherwise. Source: Manifest and annual 
reports. 
CEO ownership The number of shares held by the CEO divided by total shares 
outstanding. Source: Manifest and annual reports. 
Stock-based to total CEO 
compensation 
The value of stock options and restricted stock grants, divided by total 
CEO compensation for the individual year. Source: Manifest and annual 
reports 
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Appendix B. Economic effects. 
This table summarizes the economic effects of proposal and firm characteristics on the voting outcomes as 
shown in Model 5 of Table 10, and on the probability of proposal submissions and the cumulative abnormal 
returns as shown in Model 5 of Tables 11. The variables are described in Appendix A. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 Proposal probability Voting outcomes 
Cumulative abnormal 
returns 
  Exp. Sign 
Economic 
effect Exp. Sign 
Economic 
effect Exp. Sign 
Economic 
effect 
Panel A: Proposal characteristics 
Times submitted   + nss   
Number of proposals at meeting      + nss  - -0.004* 
Elect director    0.218***  nss 
Remove director    0.206***  nss 
Corporate governance    nss  nss 
Corporate governance - loosening    nss  nss 
Asset restructuring    nss  0.565* 
Capital structure    nss  nss 
Payout policy    nss  nss 
Corporate social responsibility    nss  nss 
Other        0.674***   nss  
Panel B: Financial, performance and ownership characteristics 
Log of assets   - nss + 0.005** 
Debt-to-equity - -0.069** - 0.018*** - -0.003*** 
Market-to-book  nss  0.025* - 0.004** 
Prior one-year abnormal stock return - -0.379** - 0.250*** - 0.029** 
Prior one-year stock turnover + 0.494*** + nss + nss 
Institutional ownership – pressure sensitive  3.331**  nss  nss 
Institutional ownership – pressure insensitive + 2.298*** + nss + nss 
Shareholder concentration + 0.310**     
Panel C: Governance characteristics 
Board size  nss  - nss  - -0.005* 
Board size squared  nss + nss + nss 
Executive directors  nss + nss + nss 
Average age of nonexecutive directors  nss - nss - nss 
Separate chair and CEO  nss - nss - nss 
CEO ownership  nss - nss - nss 
Stock-based to total CEO compensation  nss - -0.223*** - 0.039** 
 
